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ABSTRACT
Cryptofinance is a term that describes the application of Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies,
and blockchain technology to the traditional domains of finance; this includes both asset
pricing and corporate finance. This work first documents the new technology, peer-topeer financial instruments and how they trade, evaluates the small but growing literature
in finance and economics, and then explores important relationships that explain crosscountry differences in cryptocurrency premiums. The first finding is that investors pay a
persistent premium over global prices in countries with less economic freedom,
particularly when there exist barriers to trade, less secure property rights, or foreign
exchange and capital controls limiting investment freedom. Using the Heritage
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Indices, I find that a one standard deviation increase in
the composite index leads to an 8.1% decrease in premiums. Three channels dominate:
(1) there is higher demand for cryptocurrencies where there is lack of economic
opportunity, (2) binding frictions such as capital and financial controls drive prices
higher, and (3) jurisdictional risk hedging plays a significant role. Subsample analysis
shows that as much as 40% of this premium is related to black market exchange rates.
Measures of economic opportunity, such as economic decline or uneven economic
development are negatively related to premiums. For instance, a one standard deviation
increase in uneven economic development results in 6.7% higher premiums. Where there
exist capital controls, such as surrender of foreign exchange, premiums are 9.4% higher.
Various political risk measures are significantly related to premiums. A one standard
v

deviation increase in special transactions risk or currency transfer risk is related to 8.0%
and 8.2% higher premiums, respectively. Countries with weaker institutions, pervasive
corruption, fewer political rights, or fragile states have persistently high premiums. Next,
I investigate the effects of banking system access, stability, access to credit, and maturity
of capital markets on cross-country differences in cryptocurrency premiums. Physical
access to banking services, as measured in ATM and bank branch density, is negatively
related to premiums. A one standard deviation increase in both ATM and bank branch
density results in 5.2% and 5.3% lower premiums, respectively (against average
premiums of 7.0%, so the effects are large in economic magnitude). Premiums are
persistently higher in countries with fewer creditor and borrower legal rights (a one
standard deviation increase in legal rights is related to 2.7% lower premiums), a higher
composition of nonperforming loans in their banking systems (5.8% higher premiums for
a one standard deviation increase), and with lower ratios of liquid assets to deposits in
their banking system. Taken together, these results indicate that part of cryptocurrency
adoption around the world is related to substituting for inadequately provided financial
services, and for hedging against banking system instability.
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PREFACE
This collection of essays is both an introduction to cryptofinance, as well as a
substantive contribution to explaining why cryptocurrencies face binding frictions across
countries that manifest in persistent price differences for the same assets. The heart of this
exploration comes down to heterogenous marginal value these new assets provide across
jurisdictions. Where there is a lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity, poor
governance, weaker institutions, pervasive corruption, and fewer political rights, people
are turning to cryptocurrencies as a gateway into a new peer-to-peer financial world that
can be seen as an emerging substitute for existing banking and financial services.
My journey with Bitcoin started in 2012 as an enthusiastic participant in what was
thought by an early few to be a revolution. While the world looks very much today like it
did back then, there are key differences for which we see evidence in this research that this
technology is changing the concept of money and how people obtain basic financial
services. In the midst of starting this project in 2016, I quite accidentally became an active
participate in cryptofinance by launching a cryptocurrency, ZenCash, which has evolved
into a popular privacy-preserving blockchain system called Horizen. This research is a
combination of both academic inquiry and first-hand experience in shaping a new industry.
I hope my journey into cryptofinance opens new areas of inquiry that can ultimately make
the world a better place.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOFINANCE
Cryptofinance is a term coined by Harvey (2014) to describe the application of
Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and blockchain technology to finance. It is a sweeping term that
can be applied to asset pricing, corporate finance, and financial economics, and from as
early as 2013 we have seen a variety of research either make use of the new digital assets
as instruments for empirical studies or attempt to describe the financial characteristics of
Bitcoin. This chapter surveys the early academic literature, explores the basics of
blockchain technology, and then highlights major areas of public blockchain systems that
are relevant for future research, including consensus algorithms, governance, and
decentralized finance (DeFi) applications.
1.1 EARLY ACADEMIC LITERATURE
Cryptofinance has only recently entered the finance literature, so the field is wide
open to study. Harvey (2014) maps out the origins of the blockchain technology, some of
its economics, and identifies a variety of risks. Evans (2014) complements this work with
an economic description of decentralized public ledger currency platforms. Fink and
Johann (2014) make use of publicly available pricing and exchange trade data to perform
a variety of financial econometrics tests to characterize market microstructure, and Glaser
and Zimmerman (2014) evaluate the revealed intentions of users to gauge whether they
consider BTC to be an alternative currency, or a speculative asset; Baur et al. (2018) update
this analysis and conclude that usage is primarily speculative. Briere, Oosterlinck, and
1

Szafarz (2013) explore portfolio considerations when including small amounts of BTC in
a well- diversified financial portfolio. Because cryptocurrency returns have not historically
covaried with those of other financial assets, such as stocks and bonds, adding highly
volatile digital assets reduces portfolio variance and increases efficiency.
Yermack (2013) argues that Bitcoin appears to behave more like a speculative
investment than a currency because its market capitalization is high compared to the
economic transactions it facilitates. Bouri et al.. (2017) find that Bitcoin is a poor hedge
against larger market shocks and is better employed as a portfolio diversifier with some
notable exceptions in specific geographic markets, like hedging against Chinese stocks,
and commodities. Taking a contrary position, Dyhrberg (2016) describes Bitcoin as
“something in between gold and the American dollar on a scale from pure medium of
exchange advantages to pure store of value advantages” and that “bitcoin can be used as a
tool for risk averse investors in anticipation of bad news.”
Choi et al. (2020) take a Korea-specific look and argue that capital controls create
frictions as well as amplify existing frictions from the microstructure of the Bitcoin
network that limit the ability of arbitrageurs to take advantage of persistent price
differences. Parino et al. (2018) characterize the adoption of the Bitcoin by country and
measure social impacts. Parino identifies several socio-economic attributes such as the
GDP per capita, freedom of trade and Internet penetration as key variables correlated with
the degree of user adoption, all of which are corroborated in this study. Further, Parino
finds that “cryptocurrencies allow for fast transactions at low costs, offering a solution for
tips, donations, and micropayments without the need of a banking system.” By exploring
the possibility of cryptocurrencies acting as a disaster asset in politically volatile markets,
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as well as substitutes for lack of financial services, my research shows that factors related
to openness and freedom affect asset prices.
1.2 BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
The world’s first cryptocurrency was created in 2008 with the anonymous release
of a white paper describing a decentralized version of electronic cash, called Bitcoin
(Nakamoto, 2008). The novelty was that the new system solved the double spending
problem endemic to previous virtual currencies by introducing a hash-based proof-of-work
algorithm to safeguard the network. The Bitcoin system is essentially a decentralized
process for appending information to a public ledger, called the “blockchain”. Any kind of
information can be appended to the ledger, including asset ownership and state changes
over time. Owning a “Bitcoin” means controlling the private key to an unspent transaction
output (UTXO), or coin, and can be analogous to owning a slice of blockchain real estate
in that there is a predetermined, finite, supply and ownership is exclusionary. The key is
that with cryptocurrencies the rules of the software, to which everyone who participates in
the network implicitly agree, prescribes the supply path in both emission rate and limit.
The Bitcoin network has a maximum 21million coin limit with a particular emission path,
but other cryptocurrencies can, and certainly do, have different parameters. For instance,
there are cryptocurrencies like Dogecoin that launched with a large initial supply (100
billion coins) and have perpetual fixed emission of new coins without limit (5.256 billion
coins per year)1. Some projects, like Basis2, focus on achieving price stability by replacing
fixed parameters with an “algorithmic central bank” that adjusts supply to track the U.S.

1
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogecoin
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Consumer Price Index (CPI). Further, public blockchains, like Bitcoin, are evolving
systems and the rules can change, so investors and researchers should allow this possibility
in their estimations. Highly decentralized and widely adopted projects like Bitcoin are
harder to change core parameters, but smaller projects like Horizen have executed macro
policy changes3.
Bitcoin was created to solve a central trust issue with digital payments, but an
encoded message in the first Bitcoin block, its “genesis block,” points to perhaps a bigger
issue with fractional reserve banking. The now famous genesis block message reads “The
Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks4.” In this light, Bitcoin
can be seen as both a major innovation in decentralizing digital payment systems, as well
as a protest against the legacy financial system. Since Bitcoin was launched in 2009, there
has been an explosion of thousands of other cryptocurrencies, some with their own
innovations, many that simply copy the open source code made available by Bitcoin and
other projects. In total, this has created a new marketplace for ideas related to payment
utilities, but also new financial systems that can either improve access to market segments
historically disenfranchised from such services, or perhaps even disrupt the worst
implementations of legacy systems in parts of the world with severe distrust of the old
regimes.
Since the earliest days of modern banking, trusted third parties adjudicate
transactions to verify that the people spending money actually had it in the first place. The
third party served several key functions in addition to verifying ownership of assets prior

3
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to transfer; they also assumed the risk of fraud, chargebacks, and bore the cost of
information collection and safeguard to enhance system security. This all came at a cost
that essentially set a minimum threshold for feasible transaction size, and required
significant capital and regulatory compliance to enact, which limited competition and kept
costs high on merchants and consumers.
The way Bitcoin gets around having a central third party is by using cryptography,
proof-of-work (PoW), and a fully open public ledger. Bitcoin’s preset supply of 21 million
units is released to the market at defined intervals and apportioned to network workers
called “miners.” Everyone who “owns” Bitcoin has possession of a private key that allows
them to sign transactions using their currency share. Without the private key there is no
way to spend the corresponding cryptocurrency. Every block with newly released BTC is
appended to the public ledger, or blockchain, using a PoW process that miners perform that
apportions the block to the winner of a competition to decipher an increasingly complex
SHA256 hash algorithm5. This process of awarding new blocks to miners provides the
economic incentive to participate in the network and process transactions, the PoW method
of solving a complex hash algorithm makes the process of appending to the blockchain
sufficiently difficult to prevent fraud, and the public nature of the ledger prevents double
spending.
In addition to solving the trust issue, Bitcoin’s design as a decentralized peer-topeer payment system provides a new channel for international asset diversification and
movement of funds. People in countries with higher than average economic repression,
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Harvey (2014) does an excellent job describing the role of hash algorithms in Bitcoin.
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such as making it difficult to start and operate a business, the imposition of trade barriers,
limited property rights, high corruption, lack of judicial effectiveness, or capital and
financial controls, now have an easy way of transmitting funds out of currencies that are at
risk of losing significant value, or jurisdictions that are politically unstable. Historically, it
was difficult for people in politically unstable countries to preserve their assets and get
them out of country without confiscation; now with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies,
people in risky jurisdictions who face regulatory or basic access barriers to transmitting
funds can do so as easily as sending an E-mail. This is all true after one has obtained
cryptocurrency, but obtaining it is not yet easy around the world. It is this safe haven value
coupled with the substitution utility for lack of access to modern or stable banking services
that is the focus of this study.
1.3 CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS
Bitcoin launched in 2009 with the now famous Nakamoto Consensus, often referred
to as the “longest chain rule” from a SHA-256 PoW algorithm. The goal of any consensus
is to define the rules of the game ex ante so that every node in the p2p network knows how
to coordinate; in the case of Bitcoin and other blockchains, how to aggregate transactions
and add blocks to the public ledger. Distributed network consensus has been studied for
decades in computer science (Ferdous, Chowdhury, and Hoque, 2020), the main problem
being how to achieve shared state and data with an acceptable tolerance for failure across
a network in which there can exist malicious nodes. Blockchains can either be public in
that they are open for participation (anyone can join the network at any time), or they can
be private with specific rules for who can participate. Public blockchains require
incentivized consensus to remain decentralized, which means that economic incentives
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must be used to reward positive participation, or work, to keep the network alive. Private
networks can have non-incentivized consensus since private actors already have economic
reasons for keeping their own networks functioning. Both Ferdous et al. (2020) and Nguyen
and Kim (2018) present detailed taxonomies and properties of blockchain consensus that
span the current and rapidly growing experimentation space. Our research focuses
exclusively on public blockchains, as these are where cryptocurrencies reside, and so we
restrict our attention to incentivized consensus algorithms: PoW, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and
hybrid systems. PoW derived from early attempts at combating e-mail spamming (Dwork
and Naor, 1992), and involves provers (“miners”, as defined by Nakamoto, 2008)
performing resource-intensive computational tasks that are then verified by public network
participants called verifiers at significantly less cost. The main point is that participating as
a prover is costly and is thus resistant to various attack vectors and must be rewarded on
the margin. Costs can be imposed in raw computation or in system memory required to
solve computational puzzles, and there exist many cryptocurrencies that use each type of
PoW. Game theory considerations play a major role when considering incentivized
consensus in that pairing expectation of rewards with participation costs is key to designing
systems that can operate in equilibrium over time. Blais, Bouvard, and Casamatta
(2019) model PoW blockchain protocols as a stochastic game and analyze the equilibrium
strategies of rational, strategic miners. Mining the longest chain is a Markov perfect
equilibrium, without forking, in line with Nakamoto (2008) and the operating experience
thus far of the Bitcoin network. They also find that PoW is a coordination game with
multiple equilibria, some of which lead to orphaned blocks and persistent divergence
between chains, and forks can be generated by information delays and software upgrades.

7

Ferdous, Chowdhury, and Hoque (2020) highlight several issues with PoW mining
that have led market participants to seek alternatives: Energy consumption, mining
centralization, tragedy of commons, and the absence of a penalty for misbehaving. A strong
critique of PoW mining is that it leads to excessive energy consumption, with Bitcoin,
alone, accounting for more electricity usage than the Czech Republic. The mining arms
race has also led to concentration of hash rate in specialized facilities and pools, which
ultimately poses systemic risk of a malicious miner hijacking PoW networks. Limited
supply currencies that are effectively deflationary, like Bitcoin, have decreasing block
subsidies to miners and therefore dwindling resources over time to incentivize network
security. The competition for transaction fees as block subsidies decline has led some to
speculate on a sort of tragedy of the commons that could lead miners on the margin to quit
operations and leave networks vulnerable to attack. Finally, rewards are ubiquitous to
public blockchains, but few systems introduce penalties for malicious behavior. Horizen is
one public blockchain that introduced a modification to Nakamoto consensus that penalizes
delayed block reporting, which is the primary threat vector for 51% attacks6.
The other major class of incentivized consensus algorithms are Proof-of-Stake
(PoS). These involve committing, or staking, the public blockchain’s cryptocurrency as the
scarce resource to secure the network. Analogous to how PoW algorithms impose cost on
provers by requiring computation and therefore physical hardware, PoS algorithms impose
cost by requiring the network’s cryptocurrency to be staked. A random draw is performed
at discrete block intervals to determine which participant wins the right to append the next

https://www.horizen.io/assets/files/A-Penalty-System-for-Delayed-Block-Submissionby-Horizen.pdf
6
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block to the ledger, the likelihood of winning is proportional to the prover’s relative stake.
As with PoW algorithms, provers are rewarded for participating, but the rewards differ in
composition. Provers, or “forgers” in PoS algorithms, are either paid purely transaction
fees, an interest rate that allows the cryptocurrency to inflate over time, or both. Since
attacking a public blockchain network has significantly negative impact on its
cryptocurrency (Shanaev, Shureava, Vasenin et al., 2019), the virtue of requiring majority
stake in order to attack a PoS network puts significant capital at risk to a potential attacker
who needs to weigh such collateral risk against potential proceeds in successfully executing
an attack. The main taxonomical differentiators for PoS algorithms are the reward process
and selection process for awarding the right to append the ledger, including the ability to
delegate stake. There are limitations to PoS algorithms, such as potential collusion amongst
validators, a wealth effect, a variety of attacks that exploit not using hardware (e.g.
Nothing-at-stake attack), and attacks on imperfect randomness. On the positive attributes
of PoS, energy usage is significantly lower than PoW since there is no specialized hardware
performing computations to secure the network, this reduces mining centralization risk,
and the process of staking aligns economic incentives of provers with cryptocurrency
holders so that the group that could mount an attack on the network has the most to lose by
doing so.
Despite the limitations of PoW and the proliferation of new PoS alternatives, PoW
algorithms continue to dominate the industry with about 93% of market valuation7. This is
mainly due to the two largest and most valuable networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, being

7
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early PoW blockchains, but with Ethereum in process of migrating to PoS it is possible the
landscape can shift over time.
1.4 GOVERNANCE
Early discussions on public blockchain governance focused exclusively on
software consensus, but speaking abstractly about “miners,” developers, and users quickly
turned into speaking about real people who had to make decisions. Böhme et al. (2015)
provide an overview of Bitcoin’s economic characteristics and governance, emphasizing
decentralization and engineering-based rules design for participating machine
enforcement. Musiani, Mallard, and Méadel (2018) describe Bitcoin as a protocol that was
never meant to be governed but ultimately succumbed to a “redistribution of authority and
power” as business opportunities arose and significant value accrued from participation.
Nabilou (2020) proposes a governance model for Bitcoin that maximizes its core value
proposition of being a “censorship-resistant store of value and payment infrastructure.”
This builds from the idea that Bitcoin and other public blockchains are decentralized, that
discretionary authority does not rest with specific agents.
Gavin Andresen, the first identifiable person to receive Bitcoin code repository
control from Satoshi Nakamoto, and who was described early as Bitcoin’s “Chief
Scientist,” made it clear how the network was actually governed early on: “If you go back
in history, it was really simple. It was whatever Satoshi decided at the beginning8.”
Bootstrapping on a “benevolent dictator” model may have been both normal and even
optimal, but as the network grew in popularity and value, decentralization become a
dominant goal. Andresen summarized the sentiment: “How do we evolve from — it used
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to just be Satoshi making decisions; to it was this small group making decisions; to
suddenly there’s a much larger set of people who are interested in decisions and how
they’re made.” On one extreme was the idealism that the only rules needed were those that
could be coded into the blockchain software, the rest would take care of itself9. This is true
in its purest form. What we call “Bitcoin” today is not the same network that Satoshi
Nakamoto launched in 2009. There are few people, if any, running the original software
and those who do are not referred to as running “Bitcoin” by markets or popular perception.
What today is called “Bitcoin” is a fork of many forks upon many changes to the original
codebase, the result of which has been broadly accepted as “Bitcoin.” If code were the only
Sheriff in town, then today’s version of Bitcoin would be called something else entirely,
as each backward incompatible software change ought to be its own project with its own
brand. De Filippi and Loveluck (2016) distinguish between “governance by the
infrastructure (achieved via the Bitcoin protocol) and governance of the infrastructure
(managed by the community of developers and other stakeholders)” in an analysis of the
political economy of Bitcoin that emerged from a seemingly minor technical debate. They
note that “the Bitcoin network exhibits a strong market-driven approach to social trust and
coordination, which has been embedded directly into the technical protocol,” while also
acknowledging that “the development and maintenance of the Bitcoin code ultimately
relies on a small core of highly skilled developers who play a key role in the design of the
platform.”

https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/the-battle-for-p2sh-the-untold-story-of-the-firstbitcoin-war
9
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Some public blockchains, such as Decred10and Tezos11, have implemented onchain voting systems for direct stakeholder democracy in decision-making. Zhang,
Oliynykov, and Balogun (2019) focus on blockchain community resource decisions being
made via voting, and several notable decentralized finance (DeFi) applications have
implemented voting by special governance tokens (e.g., Compound, Aave, and
MakerDAO). The trend is to grow participation in decision-making beyond “benevolent
dictators,” software developers, and miners. Ultimately the concept of governance will
evolve to optimize function to suit a wide variety of objectives. Bitcoin is notably a
censorship-resistant store of value, Ethereum specializes in smart contracting, and Horizen
uses sophisticated cryptography for data privacy and security; there is little reason to think
that the same governance model is optimal across the industry. How heterogenous agents
with different preferences and objectives coordinate in these new distributed networks
upon which complex new financial and economic systems are being built will be the
subject of much future scholarship. How do projects define and pursue objectives across
multiple stakeholders over time? Does decentralization matter, under what conditions and
towards what objectives? Is there an optimal balance of centralization versus
decentralization? For all of the talk about decentralization in public blockchains, a
quantitative assessment by Srinivasan and Lee (2017) paints a stark reality that neither of
the two largest projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, are close to being decentralized. Breaking
public blockchains into six quantifiable subsystems, including mining, the number of
software clients, active developers who have committed code, exchange volume, node

10
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count and distribution, and cryptocurrency address ownership, and computing Gini
coefficients and plotting Lorenz curves, Srinivasan and Lee derive average Gini
coefficients of 0.915 and 0.92 for Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively. These are widely
considered to be some of the most decentralized public blockchains, and yet there is
extreme concentration along these six key dimensions. Combined with the mechanics and
varieties of software consensus, new ways of incorporating stakeholder preferences beyond
those of the “benevolent dictator” founders, miners, and developers through on- and offchain voting systems, quantifiable measures of decentralization add another measure of
cross-sectional variation that researchers can leverage for future study in the governance
of public blockchain systems and their resulting p2p economies.
1.5 DECENTRALIZED FINANCE (DEFI)
Decentralized Finance (DeFi), or “Open Finance,” is an application area gaining
significant attention and market capitalization in the public blockchain industry.
Combining the permissionless nature of public blockchains with cryptocurrencies and the
ability to create programmable digital assets using on-chain smart contracting tools, there
has been a proliferation of DeFi applications. Leveraging blockchain networks, DeFi
applications have the potential to either complement or substitute elements of traditional
finance, such as saving and lending, asset issuance and trading, portfolio management,
trade finance, insurance, etc. Schär (2020) proposes a multi-layered framework to analyze
the implicit architecture and the various DeFi building blocks, including token standards,
decentralized exchanges, decentralized debt markets, blockchain derivatives and on-chain
asset management protocols. Popescu (2020) refers to DeFi as the “Lego of finance” in
that the tools of DeFi, being built on open, programmable, and automatically executing
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distributed networks provide the building blocks for countless applications that have the
potential to drive down transaction costs, provide unprecedented access to finance at
micro scales not previously possible with the relatively higher transaction costs of
traditional (regulated and centralized) finance. Gudgeon et al. (2020) cite over USD 700
million in capital in DeFi as of April, and just one month later in May of 2020 Popescu
cites that more than 1,000 digital assets were created and the ecosystem had grown to
550,000 users. The most common applications were in “stable coins” (digital assets that
mimic the price of an underlying asset, essentially a derivative collateralized with
cryptocurrencies in smart contracts that follow other asset prices, like the US dollar or
Euro), borrowing and lending, and decentralized exchanges.
Cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, and public blockchain networks are creating
new forms of cash flows and the DeFi industry is rapidly innovating with financial
engineering that matches products to widely varying investor preferences. For instance,
without minimum amounts, maintenance fees, or documentation anyone in the world can
acquire “stable coins,” transfer these assets into public smart contracts, and capture yield
as automated market makers (AMM) route orders through them and split fees. In essence,
this creates alternative decentralized deposit vehicles that earn yield outside of the
banking system. Other areas that researchers should be cognizant of for future research
are in “masternodes” as a new potential asset class, automated market making and
“liquidity mining” on decentralized exchanges, and different token standards and
algorithms for dynamic smart contracts that form derivatives using digital asset collateral.
In addition to the cash flows generated from borrowing and lending applications, these
other blockchain-based cash flows are spawning countless new products available to
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anyone in the world with an Internet connection. Open access, low financial barriers to
entry, global reach, little regulatory oversight, and on-chain governance are combining to
democratize finance. Zetzsche, Arner, and Buckley (2020) paint another picture, that
there are natural market forces that concentrate decision-making and wealth in DeFi, just
like in regular finance, and that this is “reconcentration in a different (but possibly less
regulated, less visible, and less transparent) part of the value chain.” To combat this, they
argue that regulation is needed to keep DeFi decentralized, and they propose the concept
of “embedded regulation” in which regulations can be coded directly into protocols and
applications. Finally, as documented by Gudgeon et al. (2020) and manifest in the March
12th (“Black Thursday”) in which a COVID-19-induced panic saw the price of
Ethereum’s token, ETH, crash more than 50% and subsequently induce emergency
auctions in the largest DeFi application, MakerDAO12, DeFi is subject to a host of
systemic, contagion, financial, and technical risks (Meegan, 2020). With the explosion of
assets issued, startups funded, new DeFi applications and protocols launched, and wave
of capital flooding this sector of the industry, it is unclear whether investors are
internalizing these risks and therefore cultivating rational expectations of future value.
What is clear is that researchers will have a virtually unlimited pick into new avenues for
study as these markets and products mature.

12

https://blockonomi.com/makerdao-emergency-5-million-dai-raised/
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CROSS-COUNTRY
CRYPTOCURRENCY PREMIUMS
Using a set of widely traded cryptocurrencies as instruments, this study measures
the impact of differences in governance on pricing. Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies
are an ideal tool to test a variety of economic theories because these are homogenous assets
with few barriers to use that trade widely around the world in both a peer-to-peer (p2p)
fashion, as well as on centralized, highly liquid exchanges in many countries. It is difficult,
to say the least, for governments to impose traditional barriers to acquisition, use, trade,
and transmission within countries or across borders. For these reasons, when we observe
significant and persistent differences in prices across countries for which we would expect
arbitrage, we can investigate underlying factors that might be inhibiting the market process.
The factors we investigate relate to governance; in particular, various degrees of economic
freedom, rule of law, and state fragility are used as complementary variables to liquidity
and market maturity measures to explain price differences across countries.
The rapid explosion and fundamental nature of Bitcoin is providing one of the most
interesting economic experiments in recent history. Bitcoin is one of the only deflationary
currency experiments in the world today because its full time-path effective supply is
contracting. Additionally, like gold and other metals, Bitcoin is a fundamentally
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decentralized open-source project and since it has financial value, it offers users the ability
to trade and transmit funds across borders with almost no barriers or transaction costs. This
characteristic is of primary interest in this paper because cryptocurrencies open a new door
into the world of cryptofinance for those in politically unstable environments or countries
with less economic freedoms. Having the same asset trading in multiple markets around
the world with few frictions inhibiting access due to its peer-to-peer nature, we now have
an ideal instrument to test a multitude of cross-country questions that the economics and
finance literatures have had to use clever proxies and techniques to answer previously. In
addition to the new Bitcoin literature presented in Chapter 1, there are two other major
branches of academic literature that influenced this research and to which this paper
contributes: (1) Financial institutions and systems, and economic and political freedoms
and their roles in growth; and (2) Financial crises, catastrophe assets, and risk pricing. The
first literature cluster suggests that governance plays a role in economics; in particular, we
present evidence that governing institutions and economic freedom influence Bitcoin
prices. This raises the question of whether the same factors might make their way into the
pricing kernel of other assets, even though they are more difficult to isolate because of
confounding factors present in traditional financial instruments. The second literature
cluster shapes the argument that investors consider Bitcoin to be a disaster asset to help
avoid either predatory or volatile political jurisdictions.
Romer (1990) was the first to successfully incorporate endogenous technical
change into the growth literature, which was later augmented by other economists,
including Heckelman (2000), Dawson (1998), Haan and Diermann (1998), and Islam
(1996) who found that institutional frameworks, like those associated with economic
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freedom, positively influenced growth, even preceded it in broad cross-country panel
studies. I consider economic freedom as a factor, not necessarily in growth, but that can
manifest in the pricing kernel for, at least, disaster assets in markets with frictions
exceeding potential arbitrage profits. Beck, Levine, and Loayza (1999) link financial
intermediation to a positive impact on factor productivity growth, which I expand on in the
negative, where lack of economic freedom adds systematic risk and influences pricing.
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1994) pose a relationship between inflation, tax evasion, and
financial repression, in which governments have incentive to repress the financial sector to
maximize easy sources of resources for the public budget, but this comes at the expense of
inhibiting social resource allocation efficiencies. Gupta (2011) shows how tax evasion
worsens in financial repression when there are readily available currency substitutes, and
here I add Bitcoin as just such a currency substitute that can be used to avoid wealth
expropriation by policy.
The next influential literature cluster to note involves the financial crisis and
catastrophe and risk pricing literatures. Reinhart (2012) documents common trends
surrounding financial crises, including the use of financial repression to ease mounting debt
burdens, currency interventions, and capital controls, or “macroprudential regulation” that
are part of an evolving trend of financial repression. In this study, these measures manifest
in Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial Freedom indices to which this
research finds a link to cross-country Bitcoin pricing. Froot (2001) finds that catastrophe
insurance is overpriced due to supply restrictions associated with market imperfections,
Zanjani (2001) attributes catastrophe insurance price differences across countries to higher
marginal capital requirements to maintain solvency, and Harrington and Niehaus (2002)
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introduce the effects of corporate income taxes to catastrophe insurance supply restrictions
and hence relatively high premiums. I expand the notion of agent insolvency beyond the
traditional corporate setting to that of private individuals who face personal or physical loss
considerations in politically volatile environments, and who, because of a variety of
mechanisms of repression, have limited options to diversify internationally or across
financial asset classes. For these agents, the introduction of a new disaster protection asset,
such as Bitcoin, to either seamlessly transmit funds across borders, or to park capital into
a financial vehicle with minimal covariance with the set of available assets in the local
market, makes paying a premium over global prices attractive. Beyond these specific
literature clusters, the fact that this paper presents about the same cryptocurrencies trading
at different prices around the world opens these assets for researchers to test many other
questions that have thus far been difficult to measure in cross-country settings. This is
particularly useful in the international business literature where researchers seek to attribute
differences in cross-country financial, economic, or banking outcomes to cultural,
institutional, or policy choice differences. For instance, Guedhami, Kwok, and Shao (2017)
investigate how differences in political and economic freedoms drive corporate payouts;
DiRienzo, Das, Cort, and Burbridge (2007) extend the literature on how economic and
cultural variables affect corruption, and show that greater access to information can reduce
corruption. In this study we see that economic freedom, political freedom, and corruption
all matter for cryptocurrency premiums, and so premiums might be another useful
instrument in measuring similar outcomes. Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown (2014) explore
various models of capitalism and how effective they are in yielding both wealth creation
and equitable distribution; it would be curious to see how these models of capitalism map
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to cryptocurrency premiums. These are just some examples that speak to the unique
opportunity that cryptocurrencies offer researchers as instruments for a variety of studies.
Cryptocurrency prices are analyzed in each country, the premiums calculated for
the local markets over liquidity-weighted global prices, and then a series of econometric
tests are performed to explain the differences. Since Bitcoin offers an efficient way to
diversify financial assets internationally with minimal transaction costs, countries with
higher degrees of economic and political repression, corruption, lack of state legitimacy,
or other jurisdictional frictions should experience premiums over global prices, ceteris
paribus. Findings suggest that, after accounting for cross-country differences in economic
opportunity, market microstructure differences, such as trading volume and market
maturity that are typically seen as causes of price differentials across markets, factors
related to economic repression and quality of governance are significant in explaining price
differences. Economic freedom, in particular, the degree of frictions to the provision of
financial services, trade barriers, and financial and capital controls that limit investment
and financial freedom are all significant factors in explaining price differences. Countries
with less freedom experience cryptocurrency prices that trade at premia relative to global
prices. This makes sense in that cryptocurrencies offer a new channel to escape financial,
or other economic, repression that increases in value with the degree of repression.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 develops the hypothesis to be
tested, Section 2.2 describes the data, sources, and econometric methodology used in the
analysis, Section 2.3 presents the results, Section 2.4 summarizes robustness checks, and
Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Since cryptocurrencies offer a new channel to diversify outside of one’s domestic
financial system, agents in economically repressive countries have more of an incentive to
move assets into this new cryptofinance regime. For instance, countries that experience
price controls, capital controls, trade barriers, or lack of independence of financial
institutions from government control would be prime candidates for this phenomenon
because investors undergo a higher-than-normal degree of asset confiscation with limited
legal ability to protect themselves by moving funds outside of local markets.
Prices can be different across markets even when the asset traded is homogeneous.
For instance, gold trades at slightly different prices across the major global markets, such
as New York, Zurich, Singapore, etc. Standard explanations in finance theory are that
market frictions, such as liquidity (e.g., trading volume and bid-ask spreads), or transaction
costs can cause the same asset to trade for different prices. There are large differences in
trading volume and bid-ask spreads across Bitcoin markets, as well as potentially other
country-specific effects that could influence supply or demand for assets, so if there is a
meaningful premium over global prices, these differences first need to be ruled out as
sufficient explanation. Fundamentally, we need to get at the question of why arbitrageurs
are not trading away cross-country differences in prices. The model used is as follows:
πi,t = βiECON_FREEDOMi,t-1 + γiLIQi,t-1 + δiCRYPTOi,t-1 + ζiXi,t-1 +
tTIMEt + εi,t (1)
Here, πi,t represents cryptocurrency premiums over volume-weighted global
average prices for market i at time t, Xi,t-1 represents a set of lagged control variables that
include the log of per capita GDP, the GDP growth rate, local currency returns,
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unemployment, and inflation; LIQi,t-1 represents lagged cryptocurrency liquidity variables
(percent of global trading volume, and the natural log of total trading volume for country
i, and the months of continuous trading in market i); CRYPTOi,t-1 are the two
cryptocurrency-specific variables mentioned above for country i in period t-1,
ECON_FREEDOMi,t-1 are the values of various governance proxies lagged one period,
including the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index for country i at time t-1,
TIMEt captures the time-fixed effects, and εi,t is the model error term.
Equation 1 exploits the cross-section of premiums with liquidity variables (total
trading volume, the percentage of global volume represented by a given market, and the
number of continuous months of trading, or maturity, of the market); macroeconomic
variables include the log of per capital GDP, the GDP growth rate, local currency returns,
unemployment, inflation, and proxies across a variety of governance categories, and two
cryptocurrency-specific variables that could influence cross-country prices for mechanical
reasons and therefore should be included as controls (percentage of GDP comprised of
remittances, and an indicator variable for whether there is significant cryptocurrency
mining activity in a country). Remittances have long been considered one of the first use
cases for Bitcoin because the p2p payment system makes it exceedingly easy to transmit
funds to anyone in the world. Recipients of cryptocurrency remittances have a mechanical
demand to trade these funds for local currency and to do so outside of financial market
considerations, purely for utility. A similar liquidation demand comes from countries with
heavy cryptocurrency mining operations in which recipients of cryptocurrency through the
business of mining have the mechanical need to sell to cover costs.
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We test whether the degree of economic repression, unstable political regime, or
generally weak institutions in a country can explain differences in cryptocurrency trading
premiums over liquidity-weighted global prices. Investors in highly repressive
environments have a higher incentive to buy cryptocurrencies, this extra demand justifying
local market prices significantly higher than global prices. Conversely, investors in
countries with high economic opportunity that are stable and well-governed, do not have
the same marginal benefit by substituting into cryptofinance products, including the
currencies. Economic repression also causes market distortions that, if large enough, could
limit arbitrage trading. Conversely, investors in relatively free and open markets with lower
transaction frictions or access barriers to asset diversification internationally, would not
have the same incentive to pay a premium over global prices, and they would likely have
additional mechanisms to take advantage of price deviations in their local markets in the
absence of capital controls. In this sense, economic freedom can play a conditional
relationship in which we see high premiums in countries with less freedom and poor
governance, and discounts (negative premiums) or entirely convergent prices in countries
with high economic freedom, political stability, and otherwise good governance. Formally,
the hypothesis to be tested is:
!!" : Economic freedom is negatively related to premiums
The coefficient βi being statistically different from zero would provide evidence
that the relative economic freedom in a country contributes to cryptocurrency prices trading
at persistent premiums. In addition to investigating the relationship between the Economic
Freedom Index, we break the index into its most relevant components–Property Rights,
Business Freedom, Monetary Freedom, Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and
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Financial Freedom–and analyze how each one relates to cryptocurrency premiums
independently. We also explicitly test contributing factors to the Economic Freedom
indices, such as the existence of capital and financial controls, corruption, and we test other
proxies for political stability and various systemic risks in a country. The model
specification for each of these tests is identical to what is done for the composite index, βi
being the coefficient of interest.
2.2 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Cryptocurrency transaction data is publicly available and includes price and volume
information across 130 countries. Quandl provides convenient access to the
Nasdaq/Cryptocompare database aggregating cryptocurrency prices across 130 countries,
and includes end of day prices and daily volume for the most widely traded cryptocurrency
pairs13. This study includes pooled data for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Tether, and
Ripple, though Bitcoin makes up over half the sample. The data range used in this study is
from January, 2013 to April, 2020. Prices are quoted in local currency, which are then
matched to the Federal Reserve’s H.10 Foreign Exchange Rates to normalize into USD14.
A subsample analysis is performed to evaluate the effects of black market exchange rates.
USD-normalized cryptocurrency prices are aggregated across countries to derive a baseline
world price that is weighted by trading volume.
The Heritage Foundation publishes an annual Index of Economic Freedom that
measures economic freedom in 186 countries based on a composite of a dozen subindices.
Values range from 0 to 100 for the indices, greater freedoms are associated with higher

13
14

https://www.quandl.com/databases/CAGHD/documentation?anchor=productoverview.
Where H.10 data is unavailable, exchange rates are taken from investing.com.
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index values. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia rank as the most economically free
countries, while Venezuela, Argentina, and Ukraine rank as the least free in the sample.
Several variables from this index are used as proxies for economic repression in this study.
Table A.1 shows average index values for countries included in the sample.
A wide range of proxies were used to measure the effects of governance quality on
cryptocurrency premiums. These include data on capital controls from the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database, and a data aggregator
service15 was used for a variety of indicators, including shadow economy data, remittances,
rule of law variables, political risk indicators, mobile phones and internet penetration,
banking system access, banking stability, share price data, stock market maturity, measures
of innovation, demographics, measures of inequality, fragile state variables, and money
variables (e.g. money supply, CPI levels, various credit variables for households to
businesses, policy rates). Information about Bitcoin mining comes from the University of
Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance16 and any country that appears in the Top 10
mining share at any point is coded with an indicator variable. Bitcoin mining is used as a
proxy for mining of all cryptocurrencies in this sample.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.1 for key variables. The distribution of
premiums across countries is highly skewed and has changed significantly over time, as
one would expect as markets mature and arbitrageurs enter. Average premiums in the
sample are 6.7% over volume-weighted average prices, but this comes with a minimum of
-20% to a maximum of 183%, even after winsorizing premiums at the 1% level to prevent

15

https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/download-data.php. Sources include: The World
Bank, IMF, Freedom House, and The Heritage Foundation.
16
https://cbeci.org/mining map
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics

The sample includes 7132 country-month observations across 130 countries and five
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, Tether, Ripple) from January, 2013 to
April, 2020. Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom variables range from 0 – 100, higher
economic freedom being associated with a higher score. Premiums are winsorized at the
1% level to prevent extreme values from skewing the results.
extreme values from skewing results. Cryptocurrency prices in Venezuela were the real
outlier, with average premiums well over 230,000%, but other notable markets include
Albania with over a 3,200% average premium, and Angola with over 110%. Figure 2.1
shows the time-series of average global premiums, which is not only positive and
persistent, but actually in an uptrend over the last couple years of the sample.
Cryptocurrency premiums in 35 countries in the sample exhibit convergence to the volumeweighted average global price, but premiums in most countries remain significantly
different. Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A show sample countries that converge and
fail to converge, respectively, in premiums over time. Table A.1 in Appendix A display
average premiums by country and cryptocurrency with associated t-statistics.
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Figure 2.1: Average Premiums over Time
Cryptocurrency returns in the sample average 4.0% monthly, but come with major
volatility. The worst return in the worst month was below -60% and the highest monthly
return was over 180%., the median monthly return being 1%. A nontrivial part of the return
distribution resides in the right tail with the 75th percentile return being 14%. These are for
the most valuable, liquid, and heavily traded cryptocurrencies, the cryptocurrency
equivalents of large capitalization stocks.
There is wide heterogeneity in all of the control variables, macroeconomic data,
and the Heritage Foundation index values. While we should be cautious drawing inferences
from indices that summarize the outcomes of dozens, if not hundreds, of unobservable
underlying factors that influence outcomes at the country level, there is information to be
gained exploiting relative differences and changes over. The regression models account for
major differences in opportunity across countries, and a battery of robustness checks
including instrumental variables and difference-in-differences regressions all yield
consistent results. Table 2.2 presents cross-correlations for premiums across the
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cryptocurrencies in the sample: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Tether, and Ripple. Premiums
for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, and Tether are positively and significantly correlated at the
1% level. The main takeaway is that where there exist underlying factors in a country
driving premiums in one cryptocurrency, there are likely to be premiums in all
cryptocurrencies traded in that market. Table 2.3 presents correlations for premiums
against the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom variables, all index values being
negatively and significantly correlated with premiums as one would expect if governance
factors drive persistent deviations from global average prices. Univariate analyses confirm
this negative relationship for all of the economic freedom variables, with Monetary
Freedom and overall Economic Freedom having the largest negative coefficients. Results
are driven by BTC and ETH premiums, which are the two largest cryptocurrencies by
market capitalization.
2.3 REGRESSION RESULTS
This study uses generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with time-fixed effects
included and treatment of standard errors at the country level. A variety of model
specifications are tested for robustness and endogeneity and omitted variables concerns are
addressed with an instrumental variables analysis constructed similarly to Guedhami,
Kwok, and Shao (2017) in which Hofstede’s (2001) cultural variables of Power Distance
and Uncertainty Avoidance are instrumented for the economic freedom indices.
2.3.1 ECONOMIC FREEDOM
Table 2.4 presents results for the economic freedom indices with coefficient
estimates for the composite Economic Freedom Index being negative and significant at the
5% level. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in Economic Freedom
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Table 2.2: Correlations for Cryptocurrency Premiums

Pairwise correlations for average premiums over liquidity-weighted global prices.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
is an 8.1% decrease in premium, the magnitude of which is large relative to the 6.7%
sample mean. Nonlinear analysis in a later section shows that this effect is dominated by
countries in the categories the Heritage Foundation labels “Mostly unfree” (a score
between 59.9-50) and “Repressed” (a score below 49.9). Subsample analysis in Section
2.4.6 shows that part of this premium is related to black market exchange rates.
All index coefficients are negative, Financial Freedom exhibiting the strongest
component relationship with a one standard deviation increase in index value resulting in
a 6.7% decrease in premium and the result being significant at the 1% level. Financial
Freedom measures banking efficiency as well as the financial sector’s independence from
government control or interference, the results here suggest that more controls are related
to higher premiums. A more detailed investigation into banking system access, credit
availability, bank concentration, and banking system stability is the subject of Chapter 3.
Investment freedom measures foreign exchange and capital controls, investment
restrictions, and expropriation of investments without fair compensation. A one standard
deviation increase in Investment Freedom is associated with a 5.9% decrease in premiums.
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Table 2.3: Correlations of Premiums with Economic Freedom Variables

Correlations of average cryptocurrency premiums with the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom index and component indices.
Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level.
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Table 2.5 presents analysis into IMF capital controls indicators that sheds more
light onto this result. Both capital transactions controls and surrender requirements are
significantly related to premiums. The effects can be quite large, with a one standard
deviation increase in surrender requirements related to 9.4% higher premiums. Trade
Freedom is a measure of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and we see that it is also
negatively related to premiums. A one standard deviation increase in Trade Freedom results
in 5.7% lower premiums. Monetary Freedom, a measure of average lagged inflation with
a penalty for various government activities that distort prices, has a marginal effect of a
one standard deviation increase in the index resulting in a 4.3% decrease in premiums. The
only control variable with consistently significant effect is the log of volume, which is
consistent with theory in that higher volume tends to drive price differences down. A
deeper dive into the data indicates that inflation has an interesting relationship with
premiums. For the worst inflation offenders (e.g., Venezuela and Argentina) we see
hyperinflation significantly positively related to premiums. The inflation extremes and
resulting cryptocurrency premia are so severe in the sample that we have two regimes of
either a small subsample of hyperinflation countries with enormous premiums and another
regime in which the relationship between inflation and premia actually reverses, on
average. In this sense, cryptocurrencies can be seen as a lifeline for those in environments
of hyperinflation, but when inflation comes down to more moderate levels this disaster
asset demand goes away. Taken together, a story emerges in which a component of
cryptocurrency demand relates to missed opportunities in private economic life and
adoption demand being strongest in countries with less economic freedom.
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Table 2.4: Regression Results for Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Indices
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Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

Table 2.5: Regression Results for Capital and Financial Controls

Regressions with IMF capital controls indicators use GLS estimation with time fixed
effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the
1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of
10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
There is an emerging story here that people in societies with less economic
freedom, barriers to trade, insecure property rights, price controls, and capital and financial
controls are willing to pay persistently higher premiums for cryptocurrencies, even when
accounting for cross-country differences in economic opportunity and market
microstructure factors like liquidity and market maturity.
2.3.2 RULE OF LAW VARIABLES
There are many possible reasons why people in less well governed societies would
seek escape, and cryptocurrencies open the door for at least economic relief. The Economic
Freedom indices span a wide range of factors related to social, political, and economic
well-being, but it is illustrative to further explore subcomponents in more detail. The idea
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is that the quality of governance matters in driving relative demand for cryptocurrencies as
a sort of escape vehicle from repression that inhibits opportunity. Table 2.6 presents results
for a variety of rule of law variables provided by The World Bank. Two corruption indices
show that both the actual and perceived levels of corruption matter. Higher corruption
control and lower perceptions of corruption in society are related to lower premiums. A
one standard deviation increase in both the corruption control index and the perception of
corruption results in a staggering 8.5% lower premiums. This fits the overall theme thus
far in that good governance reduces the demand for alternative assets that can be used to
escape repressive jurisdictions.
2.3.3 CRYPTOCURRENCY ADOPTION AND TAXES
One explanation for the relationship between economic freedom and premiums is
that people could be using cryptocurrency to avoid taxes. Intuitively, one might think that
high economic freedom is generally associated with lower taxes, but it turns out that there
is a positive correlation (0.164, significant at the 1% level) between the tax burden relative
to GDP and economic freedom. Table 2.7 shows that there is a negative relationship
between tax burden and premiums, meaning that premiums are lower in higher tax
countries. A one standard deviation increase in the tax burden yields 3.1% lower premiums.
Conversely, we see confirmation of the prior results about Trade Freedom in that tariffs
are positively related to premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the tariff rate
results in 4.4% higher premiums. Additional analysis (available upon request) interacting
the provision of public services with the tax burden points to a government capacity story
in which cryptocurrency adoption is more about getting value for taxes paid rather than
avoiding them.
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Table 2.6: Rule of Law Variables

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
2.3.4 DEMOGRAPHICS, TECHNOLOGY PENETRATION, AND INNOVATION
A variety of additional analyses are performed to explore factors that influence
cryptocurrency adoption around the world, the results of which are available upon request.
As a new technology, there is a learning curve and basic product or infrastructure barrier
to joining the cryptofinance ecosystem. These are digital products and therefore some basic
access to the Internet or telephony networks is needed. Parino et al. (2018) found that
Bitcoin adoption is occurring in countries with greater Internet penetration, results of this
study confirm that premiums are lower in countries with more broadband Internet access.
I also find that more innovative societies with a higher fraction of high-tech exports tend
to have lower cryptocurrency premiums. Populations with a higher percentage of older
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people (65+ years of age) have lower premiums, and populations with higher percentages
of younger people (0-14 years of age) and those with a greater percentage of dependents
have higher premiums.
2.4 ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
The indices used in this study are a mix of quantitative and qualitative metrics that
invariably come with their own problems in measurement, missing or confusing latent
factors, endogeneity, omitted variables, and a number of other known issues with crosscountry analyses. The econometric setup in both the model and the preferred estimation
method were chosen carefully to mitigate these issues, but it is important to perform a
variety of checks to ensure results are robust to changes in the model (controls and
nonlinearities), estimation techniques, sample construction and data frequency, and even
the indices themselves. The following section performs the tests and finds these main
results remain consistent.
2.4.1 FRAGILE STATE VARIABLES
One of the main results of this study is that poorly governed countries rife with
corruption and deprived of opportunities due to lack of economic freedom also tend to be
more fragile states and have higher cryptocurrency premiums. The Fund for Peace
publishes twelve indices and a composite index called the Fragile State Index that evaluate
key indicators that give us a sense for relative state stability. The higher the index value,
the worse the environment. For instance, a higher index value for Public Services indicates
that fewer and lower quality public services are available to people in that country. Looking
at these indices provides a relevant check to see if the main results are robust to related but
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Table 2.7: Regression Results for Tax Variables
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Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

different indices. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 present regression results evaluating the relationship
between cryptocurrency premiums and these fragile state variables. The composite Fragile
State Index, Economic Decline, and Uneven Economic Development are positively related
to premiums. Economic decline and uneven economic development induce people to seek
opportunities elsewhere, and the p2p ecosystems enabled by cryptocurrencies are one such
alternative. Where people have either the want or need to seek opportunity elsewhere, there
exists stronger demand for cryptocurrencies. Results in Table 2.9 indicate that countries
with lower state legitimacy, poor provision of public services, and that do a poor job
protecting human rights are related to higher premiums.
2.4.2 POLITICAL RISK INDICATORS
The Political Risk Indicators17 used in this study cover a wide range of financial,
business- related, political, and physical risks associated with violence. High risk countries
are those with weak governments and either strong active or latent issues. Examples of
estimating political risk by using financial analysis are the Political risk (short term) and
Political risk (medium term) variables. These assess the capacity of a country to honor its
short- and medium-term payment obligations by tracking liquidity of government
securities. Currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction risk refers to the inability to
convert and transfer an investment out of a country, and the risk of expropriation
encompasses all discriminatory measures which deprive investors of adequate
compensation. The Political violence indicator looks at the actual levels of internal violence
and external conflict with other countries, as well as at the conflict potential that arises
from lingering internal and external tensions, frustration and dissatisfaction.

17

Source: Credendo Group.
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Table 2.8: Regression Results for Fragile State Variables (Part 1)
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Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

Table 2.9: Regression Results for Fragile State Variables (Part 2)

40
Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

Taken together, these indicators are a good robustness check for the main results of
this study as they span the governance space related to quality, stability, and legitimacy
that either foster or inhibit opportunity. The results are presented in Table 2.10 and are
uniform in the relationship between risk and cryptocurrency premiums: all indicators have
positive coefficients significant at the 5% level. Higher political risk as measured by
liquidity in government debt instruments points to a clear relationship between higher risk
yielding higher premiums, as do the risks associated with special (cash) transactions and
uncompensated expropriation. Finally, where the risk of political violence is higher, so are
cryptocurrency premiums, which supports the safe haven hypothesis.
2.4.3 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ANALYSIS
The preferred estimation method in this study is to use GLS estimation with timefixed effects, controls to account for cross-country differences in economic opportunity,
liquidity controls, cryptocurrency-specific controls, and clustering standard errors by
country. There still remain concerns of endogeneity and omitted variables bias, and so an
instrumental variables analysis was performed using Hofstede’s cultural indicators of
Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance as instruments to the economic freedom
variables. This setup follows Guedhami, Kwok, and Shao (2017) where Power Distance
measures the extent to which a society accepts uneven distribution of power, which should
be associated with a country’s governance institutions. Uncertainty Avoidance focuses on
how cultures adapt to changes and cope with uncertainty, which includes relative interest
in politics, degree of political expression, and types and structure of laws. Table 2.11
presents results of these two-stage regressions, where we can see that both instruments are
highly correlated to the economic freedom variables, the Hansen J statistic
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Table 2.10: Regression Results for Political Risk Indicators
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Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

overidentification test fails to reject the model, and the main results of the study remain
consistent in that premiums are negatively related to economic freedom.
2.4.4 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES (DD) ANALYSIS
If there is a causal relationship between economic freedom and cryptocurrency
premiums, then as a country’s economic freedom significantly changes, we should see a
corresponding change in premiums. Defining significant changes as a one standard
deviation movement in a year, we introduce dummy variables for significant improvements
or declines in the economic freedom variables. Table 2.12 presents results for linear
probability estimates without controls, which shows that a jump in Trade Freedom is
related to a significant drop in premiums. There were no significant results when using the
full set of controls. Table 2.13 presents results of logit analysis regressing a major jump in
premiums against the improvement and decline indicator variables previously constructed.
A major jump in premium is defined as either a one standard deviation increase in a year
or a movement from below the median to above the 75th percentile of premiums. Similarly,
a major drop in premiums is either a one standard deviation decrease or a shift from above
the median to below the 25th percentile. Results in Table 2.13 show that declines in
Economic Freedom, Business Freedom, and Trade Freedom are all related to increases in
the log likelihood of a significant jump in premiums. Adding controls in Table 2.14 sees
the effects go away except for Trade Freedom. Finally, we investigate the determinants of
a major drop in premiums with results presented in Table 2.15. We see that a significant
improvement in Monetary Freedom is positively related to a major drop in premiums.
Overall, these results of this section support the primary findings of the study in that
economic freedom is negatively related to premiums.
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Table 2.11: Instrumental variables analysis of the effect of economic freedom on premiums

44
Regressions are two-stage using Hofstede’s Power Distance Index and Uncertainty Avoidance Index as instruments, and standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

Table 2.12: Linear probability analysis of major changes in economic freedom

45
Regressions use GLS estimation with standard errors clustered by country. Improvements and declines in economic freedom variables
are measured as a +/- 1s in a year. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

2.4.5 ROBUSTNESS OF MODEL CHOICE
This study began with a univariate analysis presented as cross-correlations in Table
2.3. Cryptocurrency premiums are negatively correlated to Economic freedom and all of
the Heritage Foundation component indices, these unconditional relationships significant
at the 1% level. From there the choice of what variables to add to the model as controls
follows economic logic in first conditioning on liquidity factors that theory suggests
explain cross-market pricing differences. Then macroeconomic and some cryptocurrencyspecific variables were added to the model. To ensure the results are not sensitive to these
particular combinations of control variables, this section tests various combinations of
controls. Table 2.16 presents results for these tests, and we can see the main result that
premiums are negatively related to Economic freedom is robust to model choice. The only
model in which Economic Freedom fails to be significant is when we remove the
macroeconomic variables

that control for cross-country differences in economic

opportunity, but removing these controls would be inappropriate.
2.4.6 BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATES
Some countries can have official exchange rates that differ wildly from effective
exchange rates experienced by local populations. We want to make sure that the results of
this study are not being driven by cryptocurrencies simply acting as substitutes for cash in
informal exchange rate markets. A composite estimate of black-market exchange rates
from the Frazier Institute was added to the panel. The data range spans 2013 to 2018, so
we performed as subsample analysis to estimate the effects of black-market exchange rate
premiums on cryptocurrency premiums. The effects are large and dampen the main results
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Table 2.13: Logistic analysis of the determinants of a major JUMP in premiums (Part 1)

47
Regressions use logistic estimation with standard errors clustered by country. Improvements and declines in economic freedom variables
are measured as +/- 1s movements. A major JUMP in premiums is defined as either a + 1s movement or a movement from below the
median to above p75. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

Table 2.14: Logistic analysis of the determinants of a major JUMP in premiums (Part 2)

48
Regressions use logistic estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Improvements and declines
in economic freedom variables are measured as +/- 1s movements. A major JUMP in premiums is defined as either a + 1s movement
or a movement from below the median to above p75. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across
cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

Table 2.15: Logistic analysis of the determinants of a major DROP in premiums

Regressions use logistic estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Improvements and declines in economic freedom variables are
measured as +/- 1s movements. A major DROP in premiums is defined as either a -1s
movement or a movement from above the median to below p25. Premiums are winsorized
at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels
of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
we find for economic freedom, but economic freedom is still significant and an important
component of the premium structure. Table 2.17 presents results for this subsample
analysis including black-market exchange rate premiums. Roughly 40% of
cryptocurrency premiums can be explained by the black-market premium. The marginal
effect for economic freedom falls to a 3.8% decrease in premiums for a similar one
standard deviation increase in economic freedom. In other words, an important part of
cryptocurrency premiums can be explained by the existence of black-market exchange
rate premiums, but it does not account for the entire premium.
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Table 2.16: Regressions for Robustness of Model Choice

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
2.4.7 CHANNEL DOMINANCE
This study evaluates a variety of variables across four main channels: capital and
financial controls (frictions), economic opportunity, tax avoidance, and jurisdictional
hedging. A natural question is which channel(s) dominate, and is there a single correlated
factor across all of them that we are picking up in the independent regressions. For
instance, maybe corruption is not an independent factor in premiums, but is simply
correlated with capital controls. To test this idea, we used the variable with the highest
marginal effect, the existence of surrender requirements, as both a control and then an
interaction variable. Table 2.18 presents results of our baseline economic freedom
regressions including surrender requirements as a control. We see the main results persist
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Table 2.17: Regression Results for Black Market Exchange Rate Subsample Analysis
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Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

even though Surrender is a significant factor in premiums. Table 2.19 goes deeper by
interacting Surrender with the economic freedom variables to explore the presence of a
correlated factor driving results. We see the main results for Property Rights and Financial
Freedom persist independently, while the effects for Business Freedom, Trade Freedom,
and Monetary Freedom seem to flow through the interaction effect. In general, this paints
a picture where capital controls are a dominant factor, but they are not driving all of the
results. Tables 2.20 and 2.21 show similar results at the channel level, where we can see
the results for corruption persist in the presence of Surrender. Here we see that both
Surrender and corruption (corruption control and corruption perceptions) are both
significant, and the effects for the corruption variables are not coming through an
interaction with Surrender. Similar analyses are available upon request for the other
channels. In almost all cases we see the main results persist when we hold Surrender as a
control and then when we use it as both a control and an interacting effect, though there
are some results that we see go away. For instance, Fragile State, State Legitimacy, and
Human Rights variables seem to go away as independent effects.
2.4.8 ANNUAL DATA FREQUENCY
In order to make sure that results are not being driven by differences in sampling
frequency for different elements of the panel, we collapsed monthly frequency data to
match the annual frequency of the economic freedom variables, and then performed all of
the major tests of this study with annual frequency data. The main results of the study are
consistent in that a variety of measures of economic freedom are negatively related to
premiums. All the channel analysis results, including for capital and financial controls,
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Table 2.18: Regressions including Surrender as a control variable

53
Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

Table 2.19: Economic freedom regressions with Surrender as an interaction effect

54
Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

Table 2.20: Channel analysis with Surrender as a control variable

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
Table 2.21: Channel analysis with Surrender as an interaction effect

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
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corruption and political stability, fragile stage variables, results for taxation variables,
jurisdictional hedging, and political risks remain consistent. Given the slow-moving nature
of changes in economic freedom, and the relatively narrow sample range covering roughly
seven years, the effects are most pronounced in cross-sectional regressions. Tables of
results are available upon request.
2.4.9 NONLINEARITIES IN ECONOMIC FREEDM
Country level indices are clunky aggregates of a lot of information that is difficult
to normalize across heterogenous societies, so it is possible that index increments relate
nonlinearly with cryptocurrency premiums. Table 2.22 tests nonlinearities in the model
by adding squared and cubic terms of the main explanatory variables. We can see that
significant nonlinearities in Economic Freedom and Trade Freedom. Figures 2.2 and 3.3
hone in on the nonlinear structure of the Economic Freedom index, so that we can think
about the economic implications. Figure 2.2 displays predicted margins for Economic
freedom with associated 95% confidence levels across the sample range of Economic
freedom. We can see that predicted premiums are largest for countries in the lowest
decile of Economic freedom. It is for these extremely unfree countries that people are
willing to pay persistently high premiums. Figure 2.3 displays the average marginal
effects across the range of Economic freedom, which shows that marginal effects explode
in the range for what the Heritage Foundation labels “Repressed” countries (0-49.9).
Marginal effects decrease as we increase in index value through the “Mostly unfree”
countries (50- 59.9), and largely disappear when we get to the “Moderately free”
countries (60-69.9). Cryptocurrencies seem to play the largest role in the most repressed
societies.
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Figure 2.2: Predictive Margins for Economic Freedom

Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Effects for Economic Freedom
2.5 CONCLUSION
Cryptocurrencies and their associated p2p financial ecosystems offer an important
new channel for funds transmission, investment, and financial services for which the legacy
system suffers binding constraints. Demand for access to the new cryptofinancial system
is so strong that people are willing to pay persistently high premiums over global prices,
and these premiums are significantly related to the degree to which people lack economic
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freedom, opportunity, fair legal systems free of corruption, or other measures of good
governance. The relationship is complex, as heterogenous as the cultures that span the
countries in our sample, but even with the limited data and crude measures in this study we
see an emerging set of characteristics that explain variations in cryptocurrency demand.
Countries with the biggest barriers to trade, insecure property rights, price controls, capital
and financial controls, a history of expropriating investments without fair compensation,
and countries in which political risk is high tend to experience higher premiums. There is
natural demand to seek alternatives that either substitute for lack of services, or move funds
outside of these regimes. One could look at the data and surmise that cryptocurrencies are
used to evade taxes, but this study portrays a more nuanced story based on government
capacity, provision of public services, and the rule of law that fosters opportunity. In this
sense, it is not about avoiding taxes, but about demanding value for your tax money. Where
there is little value in the provision of governing services, people seek alternatives. On the
other hand, countries that are well-governed, stable, and have high economic freedom have
less marginal value from entering cryptofinance and we thus see prices converge to the
liquidity-weighted global averages. This study documents an important emerging
technology that gives access to a new financial infrastructure with the potential for high
social benefits where the old system is least capable.
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Table 2.22: Testing Nonlinear Models for Economic Freedom Variables
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Regression models use the same controls as throughout the study, but not displaying for succinctness. Premiums are winsorized at the
1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Estimation method is GLS estimation with time fixed effects included
and standard errors clustered by country. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

CHAPTER 3
BANKING ACCESS, STABILITY, AND CRYPTOCURRENCY
PREMIUMS
With evidence that cryptocurrencies offer different value on the margin depending
on economic freedom and other governance characteristics, we are naturally led to extend
this inquiry into whether there are other areas of finance this technology impacts. One
premise largely maintained by the industry is that Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and DeFi
applications can “bank the unbanked18,” or, rather, leverage the permissionless and low
transaction costs features to provide financial services to those who lack access to
traditional systems. For instance, once users acquire Bitcoin, Ether, or any other
cryptocurrency, they can swap these for “stable coins,” or digital representations of the US
dollar. These stable coins can then be deposited into smart contracts and earn yields in DeFi
that vastly exceed what can be earned in USD deposit bank accounts. This makes for an
interesting substitute value proposition in that people who live in countries without access
to traditional banking services can acquire cryptocurrencies, swap them into digital dollars,
deposit the dollars into smart contracts, and earn yields far in excess of what is available in
traditional banking. This is one example of why people in countries that either lack access
to banking services or have high risk banking systems might consider paying premiums for

18

https://medium.com/coinmonks/blockchain-banking-the-unbanked-b6ae40539bd6
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cryptocurrencies. Smart contracts and cryptocurrencies have their own risks, but their
relative value is greater where traditional financial services are inadequately delivered.
This study makes a substantive contribution to the determinants of banking access
and financial inclusion literature. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Peria (2008) show that
banking access is limited by barriers such as minimum account requirements, fees, required
documents, and physical access to ATMs and bank branches. They point out that “It takes
more than $700 to open a bank account in Cameroon—more than the country's GDP per
capita. Fees to maintain a checking account exceed 25 percent of GDP per capita in Sierra
Leone. More than four types of documents are required to open a deposit account in
Bangladesh. It takes more than 20 days to process a consumer loan application in Pakistan.
It costs $50 to transfer $250 internationally in the Dominican Republic. While most people
in developed countries take access to banking services for granted, price and nonprice
barriers prevent large parts of the population in developing countries from accessing and
using formal banking services.” Allen, Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Peria (2016)
corroborate that greater financial inclusion is associated with lower account costs, greater
proximity to financial intermediaries, stronger legal rights, and more politically stable
environments. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2013) further document that for the half of all
adults around the world who remain unbanked, barriers to account use center on cost,
distance, and documentation requirements. Cryptocurrencies and the broader DeFi
ecosystem come with no minimum entry costs or transaction amounts, no documentation
requirements, and everything is digital and can be accessed with either a mobile device or
Internet connection. We show that it is in the countries with the least physically accessible
banking services that people are willing to pay the most substantial premiums over global
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average prices for cryptocurrencies and hence access to DeFi markets. Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine (2009) suggest that improvements in financial contracts, markets, and
intermediaries expand economic opportunities and reduce inequality. Expanding beyond
the determinants of access to banking and financial services, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Honohan (2009) link financial exclusion to poverty. We suggest that the bourgeoning
world of DeFi is providing a natural experiment in new financial contracts, markets, and
decentralized services in lieu of formal intermediaries, and we are seeing cross-country
differences in premiums reflect the relative demand for substitutes for traditional banking
(higher demand where traditional banking fails to deliver adequate services).
This chapter focuses on the possibility of cryptofinance offering substitutes for
banking access and banking stability. Specifically, we test the idea that differences in
access to basic banking services, as proxied by ATM, bank account, and bank branch
density, availability of banking products like credit and debit cards, and availability of
private credit can explain differences in cryptocurrency prices across countries. Using a
similar setup and cryptocurrency data as the previous chapter, findings suggest that access
to banking services and private credit are, indeed, negatively related to premiums that
persist over time. A one standard deviation increase in ATM and bank branch densities
results in 5.2% and 5.3% lower premiums, respectively (against average premiums of 7%,
so the effects are large in economic magnitude).
The second idea investigated in this chapter is whether differences in banking
system stability influence differences in cross-country cryptocurrency prices.
Cryptocurrencies could offer both a substitute for poorly provided banking services, as well
as an outlet for people who live in countries with less stable banking systems. Looking at
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an index of legal rights for creditors and borrowers, nonperforming loans, bank credit as a
percentage of deposits, z-scores, and liquidity and capitalization of banks across countries,
we find that premiums are persistently higher in countries with a higher composition of
nonperforming loans in their banking systems. A one standard deviation increase in
nonperforming loans across countries yields 5.6% lower premiums. Analyzed jointly,
creditor rights, nonperforming loans, and the proportion of liquid assets to deposits are all
significantly related to premiums in that more stable banking systems have lower
premiums.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 develops the hypothesis to be
tested, Section 3.2 describes the data, sources, and econometric methodology used in the
analysis, Section 3.3 presents the results, Section 3.4 summarizes robustness checks, and
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The empirical framework is similar to Chapter 2 in which we test whether certain
factors can explain the differences in cryptocurrency prices across countries from a
volume-weighted global average price.

The two sets of factors we test are related to

banking access and banking system stability. The model setup is similar:
πi,t = βiBANK_ACCESSi,t-1 + fiECON_FREEDOMi,t-1 + γiLIQi,t-1 + δiCRYPTOi,t-1 +
ζiXi,t-1 + tTIMEt + εi,t (2)
As before, πi,t represents the cryptocurrency premiums,

BANK_ACCESSi,t-1

denotes banking activity in country i in month t-1, we include ECON_FREDOMi,t-1 as
controls since we established in Chapter 2 that they significantly effect premiums, LIQi,t-1
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are two cryptocurrency liquidity variables, CRYPTOi,t-1 are two non-liquidity
cryptocurrency-specific variables—remittances as a percentage of GDP and an indicator
variable for whether a country has notable mining operations; both of these variables could
lead to mechanical relationships with premiums and so are controlled for in the regression
model. Other control variables are denoted by Xi,t-1 and are the same as those used in
Chapter 2. The other variant of this model substitutes banking stability for access, so the
equation can substitute BANK_ACCESSi,t-1 for BANK_STABILITYi,t-1. In every case it
is the coefficient, βi, that is of interest in evaluating our hypotheses:
!!" : Access to banking services influences premiums
!!# : Banking stability influences premiums
The idea behind !!" is that wide and persistent differences in premiums can be explained
by differences in access to banking services. Where access to banking services, like having
a bank account, living near ATMs or bank branches, or having access to credit cards, debit
cards, or other forms of private credit is limited, then we expect the coefficient βi to be
statistically different from zero. The motivation for this hypothesis is the common idea in
the blockchain industry that the technology and resulting products will “bank the
unbanked.”
The concept behind !!# is more nuanced and requires us to explore some competing
hypotheses in banking. There are a number of ways to evaluate the stability of a country’s
banking system and in this study we use nonperforming loans, bank credit as a percentage
of deposits, banking system z-scores, the ratio of liquid assets to deposits, and banking
system capital as a percentage of deposits. Because there are so many underlying
differences across countries, we also must be careful not to conclude that a higher or lower
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value for one of these factors has the same impact in different countries. For instance, there
are different hypotheses that could cause higher or lower bank concentration to lead to
either higher or lower stability in a country’s banking system. Beck et al. (2013) explore
the conditionality of a variety of factors that affect the relationship between competition
and stability, so one cannot conclude that concentration is unconditionally positive or
negative for stability. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Keeley (1990) explore unintended
consequences of increasing banking sector instability through competition, and Allen and
Gale (2004) show that in a more competitive environment banks earn fewer informational
rents from their relationships with borrowers, which reduces screening incentives and
therefore increases fragility. These competing hypotheses are summarized well by Berger,
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2017) with takeaways relevant to the study being that “banks
with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure” and “risk may
be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.” Without controls for deposit insurance,
bank activity restrictions, or other measures related to cross-sectional differences in
stability, the unconditional relationship here is that more concentration is related to more
stability, and hence premiums that differ significantly from zero.
3.2 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The panel for this analysis was constructed from the cryptocurrency panel used in
Chapter 2 along with adding banking access, banking stability, and capital markets
maturity data from The World Bank. The strength of legal rights for creditors and
borrowers is an index constructed by The World Bank and ranges from 0 (weak) to 12
(strong). The sample includes 7132 country-month observations across 130 countries and
five cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, Tether, Ripple) from January, 2013 to
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April, 2020. The first step in this empirical analysis is to explore descriptive statistics of
the key variables and their relationships with cryptocurrency premiums. Table 3.1 displays
summary statistics for the three sets of explanatory variables: banking access, banking
stability, and maturity of capital markets. Note that cryptocurrency statistics are not
included in this table since they were previously displayed in Table 2.1. There is wide
heterogeneity in all categories of variables as the sample spans the richest industrialized
countries all the way to the poorest and least developed. Some countries have just one ATM
per one hundred thousand people, 0.15 on one percent of the population with a bank
account, no credit card market and virtually no firms using bank credit, and less than one
bank branch per one hundred thousand people; while the median country in the sample has
64.5 ATMs per one hundred thousand people, nearly one-for-one bank accounts per person,
34% of firms using bank credit, 20% of people owning credit cards, and 15.9 bank branches
per one hundred thousand people (34 times more branches than the minimum). Differences
between countries are just as stark when looking at banking stability variables. The worst
country in the sample has over half its loans as nonperforming (55%), whereas the median
is only 3% in the sample. Private credit per capita ranges from less than $30 to $100
million, with a median of $6405, which indicates just how widely different conditions are
across countries in the sample.
Univariate analysis is represented by Tables 3.2 and 3.3, which show correlations
between premiums and the three categories of banking and capital markets variables. In
Table 3.2 we see that all of the banking access variables are negatively correlated with
premiums, and univariate regressions not shown here confirm that all variables except for
the percentage of firms using bank credit are statistically significant the 1% level. In Table
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Table 3.1: Banking and Capital Markets Summary Statistics

This table includes summary statistics for key banking and capital markets variables. The
sample includes 7132 country-month observations across 130 countries and five
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, Tether, Ripple) from January, 2013 to
April, 2020. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level to prevent extreme values from
skewing the results.
3.3, we see a more nuance but the general theme is that riskier banking systems tend to be
positively correlated with premiums. A higher percentage of nonperforming loans
(positive), z-scores (negative), and credit provision, liquid asset reserves, and bank
capital as a percentage of assets are all reflective of the relationship of higher banking
system risk being associated with higher premiums. Univariate regressions for all of the
variables in Table 3.3 result in strong statistical relationships with premiums, with every
variable except for bank capital as a percentage of assets significant at the 1% level (bank
capital as a percentage of assets is significant at the 5% level. More mature capital
markets are correlated with lower premiums, as we can see from the coefficients on stock
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP and stock turnover. Markets with higher
expected returns (indicated by higher realized returns) and higher volatility are positively
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Table 3.2: Correlation of Banking Access Variables with Premiums

All variables except for the percentage of firms using bank credit are significant at the 1% level based on univariate regressions not
shown here. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level to prevent extreme values from skewing the results.
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Table 3.3: Correlation of Banking Stability and Capital Markets Maturity with Premiums

All variables except for the percentage of firms using bank credit are significant at the 1% level based on univariate regressions not
shown here. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level to prevent extreme values from skewing the results.
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correlated to premiums, which hints that people in less mature and riskier capital markets
have higher demand for cryptocurrencies and digital assets on the margin.
3.3 REGRESSION RESULTS
As in Chapter 2, this analysis uses generalized least squares (GLS) estimation
with time-fixed effects included and treatment of standard errors at the country level. A
variety of model specifications are tested for robustness and endogeneity concerns of
omitted variables bias are addressed with an instrumental variables analysis constructed
similarly to Guedhami, Kwok, and Shao (2017) in which Hofstede’s (2001) cultural
variables of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance are instrumented for the
economic freedom indices. Finally, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis to
further explore the causal relationship between access to banking services and banking
stability to premiums.
3.3.1 BANKING SYSTEM ACCESS
While the univariate results paint a clear picture of negative correlation in
premiums with banking system access—mature and widely accessible banking systems
tend to have lower cryptocurrency premiums—we need to account for a range of controls
that account for cross-country macroeconomic, cryptocurrency liquidity, and blockchain
industry-specific heterogeneity, as well as the fact we learned in Chapter 2 that economic
freedom plays a significant role. We also control for time-fixed effects and cluster standard
errors by country in the GLS estimation. Testing !!" implies a βi coefficient in Equation 2
that is statistically different from zero for the banking access variables. Table 3.4 presents
results from this investigation and shows that we do, in fact, see a negative relationship
between premiums and banking access. A one standard deviation increase in both ATM
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Table 3.4: Regression Results for Banking Access Variables

71
Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

and bank branch densities in the sample yields 5.2% lower premiums, which is
economically large against the average premium of 6.7% in the sample. A similar result
holds for bank branch density, in which a one standard deviation increase in density results
in a 5.3% lower premium.
3.3.2 BANKING STABILITY
Similar to our exploration of fragile state and political risk variables in Sections
2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we extend this analysis with !!" to see if banking system stability plays a
role in premiums. The idea is that people in fragile, poorly governed, or unstable banking
systems might turn to cryptocurrencies and their alterative products, like in DeFi. Table
3.5 presents results for this exploration with mixed results. Analyzed independently, the
percentage of liquid assets to deposits in a country’s banking system is negatively related
to premiums. A one standard deviation increase in liquid assets to deposits in a country
results in a 3.1% lower cryptocurrency premium. Analyzed jointly, we see that a number
of stability related variables matter. Credit and borrower rights, nonperforming loans, and
the ratio of liquid assets to deposits all significantly impact premiums. A one standard
deviation increase in each of these variables results in 2.7% lower, 5.6% higher, and 2.3%
lower premiums, respectively. In general, more stable banking systems with better
protections for creditors and borrowers are related to lower premiums.
3.4 ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
This section tests whether these findings hold up against changes in model
specification, namely with different combinations of controls to ensure that findings are
not driven by specific combinations of controls. Endogeneity is another important issue to
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Table 3.5: Regression Results for Banking Stability Variables

73
Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at
the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **,
and *** respectively.

address, and we follow the same instrumental variables procedure as was conducted in
Section 2.4.3.
3.4.1 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ANALYSIS
The analysis was performed using Hofstede’s cultural indicators of Power Distance
and Uncertainty Avoidance as instruments to the banking stability variables. As before,
this setup follows Guedhami, Kwok, and Shao (2017). Berger, Li, Morris, and Roman
(2019) show that two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are related to the risk of bank
failures (Individualism vs. Collectivism and Masculinity vs. Femininity), and hence one
might expect them to play a role in this analysis. We first tried these two variables as
instruments for banking access, but the instruments were rejected (results available upon
request). Tables 3.6 presents results of these two-stage regressions, where we can see that
both instruments are highly correlated to the banking access variables, the Hansen J statistic
overidentification test fails to reject the model, and the main results of the study remain
consistent in that premiums are negatively related to banking access. Table 3.7 presents
results for banking stability using the national culture variables suggested by Berger, Li,
Morris, and Roman (2019). These variables did not work as viable instruments for banking
access, but are appropriate for some banking stability variables. The three variables for
which these instruments are appropriate (high correlation and Hansen J statistic not
rejecting them) are for the percentage of nonperforming loans, percentage of credit relative
to deposits, and for bank concentration. Results for the first two are consistent with the
primary results in the GLS regressions, but the negative coefficient for bank concentration
contradicts the original findings.
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Table 3.6: Instrumental Variables Analysis of the Effect of Banking Access on Premiums

75
Regressions are two-stage using Hofstede’s Power Distance Index and Uncertainty Avoidance Index as instruments, and standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

Table 3.7: Instrumental Variables Analysis of the Effect of Banking Stability on Premiums

76
Regressions are two-stage using Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism Index and Masculinity vs Femininity Index as instruments,
and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across
cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.

3.4.2 ROBUSTNESS OF MODEL CHOICE
Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks by varying the control variables
in the regression models. Table 3.8 focuses on ATM density, but similar regressions were
run on other banking access variables of interest, such as bank branch density. The results
were all consistent and available upon request. Results are all negative and significant at
the 1% and 5%, indicating that the findings were not unique to the specific combination of
control variables. Additionally, removing economic freedom and the log of trading volume
do not change results. A similar analysis was performed on banking stability variables with
results remaining consistent with the main findings of the study.
3.4.3 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES (DD) ANALYSIS
Similar to Section 2.4.4 in which we performed a variety of DD analyses for the
economic freedom variables, here we use the same techniques to investigate causal
relationships between key banking access and stability variables. Variable construction
follows the same methodology defining significant improvements or declines in regressors
as one standard deviation movements. Major jumps or drops in premiums are also defined
as they were in 2.4.4. We focus the analysis on the key variables driving results thus far in
the study: ATM and bank branch densities, and creditor rights. Table 3.9 shows that major
improvements in creditor rights are related to reduced premiums, while major declines in
creditor rights is related to increasing premiums. These results reinforce main findings for
creditor rights, but we fail to see a smoking gun suggesting causality in ATM and bank
branch densities. Next, we generate indicator variables for significant jumps or drops in
premiums, which we define as greater than a one standard deviation movement. Using this
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Table 3.8: Regressions for Robustness of Model Choice

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
Table 3.9: Linear probability analysis of major changes in banking access

Regressions use GLS estimation with standard errors clustered by country. Improvements
and declines in banking variables are measured as a +/- 1s in a year. Premiums are
winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
construction, we run logistic regressions on the same key banking access and stability
variables as determinants in the likelihood of observing major jumps or drops in
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premiums. Table 3.10 presents results for these logistic regressions exploring
determinants in the likelihood of premiums jumping. In the case without controls, we see
strong evidence that a major decline in creditor rights significantly increases the
likelihood of premiums jumping. We do not observe significant results when using the
full set of controls, but, again, given that we only have seven years of data it is not
surprising that we are not picking up unambiguous results. Table 3.11 presents results for
logistic regressions on major drops in premiums. Here we see that major improvements in
ATM densities and creditor rights significantly increase the likelihood of seeing a major
drop in premiums. Once again, adding the full set of controls significantly drops the
number of observations and results disappear.
Table 3.10: Logistic regressions for a JUMP in premiums

Regressions use logistic estimation with standard errors clustered by country.
Improvements and declines in banking variables are measured as +/- 1s movements. A
major JUMP in premiums is defined as either a + 1s movement or a movement from below
the median to above p75. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
3.4.4 ANNUAL FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
Similar to Section 2.4.6, in order to make sure that results are not being driven by
differences in sampling frequency between key variables, we collapsed all frequencies to
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Table 3.11: Logistic regressions for a DROP in premiums

Regressions use logistic estimation with standard errors clustered by country.
Improvements and declines in banking variables are measured as +/- 1s movements. A
major DROP in premiums is defined as either a -1s movement or a movement from below
the median to above p75. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
annual and re-ran all of the major tests. The main results of the study are consistent in
that ATM and bank branch densities and creditor rights are negatively related to
premiums; nonperforming loans are positively related to premiums, as they were in the
monthly frequency analysis. These results are presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.13.
Additionally, since these banking variables have greater variability over time than
the economic freedom variables in Chapter 2, we were able to pick up significant results
in fixed effects regressions. These are presented in Table 3.14 for banking access and for
banking stability in Table 3.15. Both sets of results support the main findings.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Bitcoin may not have replaced the US dollar or traditional banking just yet, but it
is certainly creating a revolution in finance. What started as a distributed peer-to-peer
electronic payment system has evolved into a burgeoning cryptofinance ecosystem
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replete with its own money (hundreds of versions), borrowing, lending, interest-bearing
depositing, insurance, decentralized exchange, derivatives, and governance. This
collection of essays introduces cryptofinance and focuses on a persistent fact that
cryptocurrencies trade at different prices across the world. The same assets are being
traded at widely different prices and arbitrageurs are not converging markets as one
would expect. There are at least two clusters of explanations explored in this work for
which we have presented evidence: (1) differences in economic freedom, frictions such
as capital and financial controls, and a variety of measures of jurisdictional risk, and (2)
access to modern banking services and bank stability. The main takeaway from Chapter
3 is that cryptofinance appears to be substituting for lack of access to banking services.
Where there are well distributed banking services in countries, as measured by ATM and
bank branch densities, and availability of various forms of private credit, we see
significantly lower cryptocurrency premiums; prices converge to the global average, as
one would expect. Bitcoin launched in 2009, but the DeFi explosion is less than a few
years old. The current products and services available on the market are in their infancy
and will only gain in sophistication, usability, and availability, so this work should be
seen as a preview to a new chapter in the future of finance. Where for the last century we
have seen immense financial innovation and proliferation by large, centralized
institutions that have leveraged significant economies of scale, we are now seeing a
frantic competitive explosion in decentralized finance that is global in scale and just
getting started.
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Table 3.12: Banking Access Regressions at Annual Frequency

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Sample is collapsed to annual data frequency.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 3.13: Banking Stability Regressions at Annual Frequency

Regressions use GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard errors
clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Sample is collapsed to annual data frequency.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 3.14: Fixed Effects Regressions for Banking Access

Regressions use fixed effects GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and standard
errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the sample pools
premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked
with *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 3.15: Fixed Effects Regressions for Banking Stability

Regressions use fixed effects GLS estimation with time fixed effects included and
standard errors clustered by country. Premiums are winsorized at the 1% level and the
sample pools premiums across cryptocurrencies. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%
are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.
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APPENDIX A
PREMIUM DETAILS AND DEFINITIONS
Additional figures and tables are provided in Appendix A. These include figures
that graphically show select markets in which premiums converge over time, and others
for which premiums significantly different from zero persist. Table A.1 presents average
premiums by country for the entire sample, and Table A.2 contains variable definitions.

Figure A.1: Average Premiums in Select Markets with Convergence
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Figure A.2: Average Premiums in Select Markets with Persistence
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Table A.1: Average Premiums by Country (Part 1)
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Average premiums and t-statistics by country for each of the cryptocurrencies in the sample (BTC, ETH, LTC, USDT, and XRP).

Table A.1: Average Premiums by Country (Part 2)
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Average premiums and t-statistics by country for each of the cryptocurrencies in the sample (BTC, ETH, LTC, USDT, and XRP).

Table A.1: Average Premiums by Country (Part 3)
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Average premiums and t-statistics by country for each of the cryptocurrencies in the sample (BTC, ETH, LTC, USDT, and XRP).

Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 1)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 2)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 3)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 4)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 5)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 6)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 7)
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions (Part 8)
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